The Gulf: Future Security and British Policy

It was only as a result of the tragic events of 1990-1991 that similar, cohesive policies of cooperation came to be pursued by other states. However, even then, not all offered the same level of consistency and support. Bahrain considers itself to be the nucleus of strategic defence from as far back as 1820, when it signed the first treaty with the British government, right through until the end of the 1970s. Bahrain has always been a keystone of western involvement in the region – nowhere more particularly so than in the fields of trade and commerce.

In the early years of oil exploration, it was Bahrain that was the base of British and American survey efforts in the region. Bahrain has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to the ideals and principles of the free world, utterly rejecting so-called revolutionary ideals such as communism, fascism, or Nazism. Bahrain suffered economically and physically during those years, and during the Italian air-raid of 1942, and communist activity directed against Bahrain right up until the end of the mid-1970s. Throughout this period, Bahrain continued to be at the forefront of the West’s defensive commitments.

In the latter half of the century, Bahrain became the forward operating base for the defence of the gulf, and Bahrain’s defence policy came to be entwined with the needs of the West’s protective policies towards the Arabian Peninsula. Bahrain was the bulwark that fought Iraq’s ambitions in 1961, when Abdul Karim Qasim assembled his forces on the Iraqi-Kuwait border ready to invade. Bahrain responded to a request from the Kuwaiti government, quickly realising how critical the situation was and, despite the reaction from the majority of the Arab world, allowed British forces to deploy in Bahrain. Bahrain further supported Kuwait when Iraq repeated the same exercise in 1973, and stood with Kuwait again during the flying tanker operations and the associated mine-sweeping operation that followed.

In 1990, Bahrain became a major centre for coordination with coalition efforts to liberate Kuwait. Despite the swift operation to occupy Kuwait, the longstanding cooperation between the west and the GCC, particularly with Bahrain, enabled massive mobilisation, preparation and logistics support to be accomplished smoothly and with minimum aid. During the war, more than 350 aircraft were deployed in Bahrain. In addition to Bahrain being a major air operational base, a further significant contribution to the war effort was its provision of facilities to run the naval campaign. The total number of personnel deployed in Bahrain reached 20,000, and the wounded were evacuated to the field hospitals which had been erected with a capacity of more than 6,000 beds. Iraqi missiles targeted Bahrain, but thankfully caused no casualties. Total costs incurred by Bahrain to support the war effort were estimated to be USD 2.1bn. Intangible costs were approximately USD 7.2bn.

Since the liberation, Bahrain has always stood with its GCC neighbours to resist further Iraqi aggression, in particular during Vigilant Warrior during October 1994. In this regard, Bahrain has closely cooperated with and supported Western efforts to deter Iraq. On very short notice, and without precedent, Bahrain was the first gulf country to host a US air expeditionary force, the AEF, in October 1995. The AEF was then a new concept, introduced in support of operation Southern Watch, and regarded as a ‘gap-fill’ for the temporary absence of a US aircraft carrier. Furthermore, Bahrain has hosted additional consecutive AEF deployments, including the first ever deployment of B-1 strategic bombers to the region. Over the last two years, Bahrain has hosted four of the seven AEF deployments to the region, in addition to supporting operation Southern Watch, Bahrain has allowed RAF tanker aircraft to operate from its international airport and has received several deployments of the RAF Lebron aircraft.

Bahrain’s commitment to the enforcement of UN resolutions also led to its hosting of UNSCOM’s Field Office, with the additional logistics support that this entails. And like Bahrain’s strategic importance and its historical commitment in supporting the defence needs of not only its own values and interests in the region, but also those of its neighbours and the West, it is of no surprise to see the US navy’s regional operations centred in Bahrain.

Since the establishment of Gulf Area Command on 1 January 1949, the US-Bahraini security relationship has evolved and deepened despite often intense pressure from some for Bahrain to cut these ties. Bahrain has allowed the NAVSENT (sic) headquarters to move ashore, in the process creating one of the most advanced communications centres in the region. The centre is certainly considered as the forward operating hub for SANGCOM. In addition, in 1997 Bahrain approved a substantial US multi-million expansion of the administrative support unit, Southwest Asia.

In short, prior to the gulf war, Bahrain provided the West’s power projection efforts and, in support of the war effort, the second largest after Saudi Arabia. Such a level of commitment from such a small state might come as a surprise to an outside observer, however those familiar with the history of Bahrain and the Gulf would find nothing unnatural in this. Yet this support has sometimes exerted a heavy toll on Bahrain and caused distraction at times when unity was essential. That is why Bahrain believes it is essential that all GCC states provide the required support on an equal basis so we can achieve and maintain security of the Gulf. Because of Bahrain’s experience and support, we feel we have the insight to review defence cooperation with the West.

Mr Chairman, in recognising and appreciating the sacrifices and efforts made by Bahrain, it has been possible to see clearly the past level of commitment between the West and the GCC. Bahrain believes that we have been reactive for too long, and that the initiative should now be seized to effectively plan together, so as to fully benefit from all political and military efforts and achieve a common strategic objective – an objective that will be supported by the international community in general, and the Arab world in particular. The GCC was established to build a common policy that would achieve and maintain Gulf security. To reach a single overall policy, obstacles on the path of GCC unity must be overcome. Hence, we need to address and realise the issues that cause disunity and disrupt development and set in motion practical efforts to overcome them. To analyse any cooperation, we start by looking at the elements that constitute the cooperation itself. The GCC, being one half of the cooperation must, as Sheikh Salman said, must continue to improve the military cooperation among them before they seek to cooperate with the West as a whole unified body.

We believe there are two major obstacles to achieving this. The first obstacle is that GCC states sometimes perceive and prioritise threats differently, whether by type, size, intention or even source. This obstacle must be addressed internally by the GCC, but also with help, whenever appropriate, from the West. The second obstacle is border disputes. Britain had realised a vacuum would be produced by its evacuation from the Gulf here in the 1970s, however Britain did not resolve the border disputes outstanding at the time of its withdrawal. I believe the GCC states are capable of solving their own border problems, but I believe the West, and the whole international community, cannot afford to stand by and let outstanding border disputes foment my adopting policies that preclude involvement. It is worth remembering that Iran invaded islands belonging to the UAE because of unresolved territorial issues, and now has the ability to threaten the freedom of navigation in the Gulf. The Iran-Iraq war was a result of territorial claims, and of course such a claim was one of the root causes of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Bahrain believes that a more proactive role by the West is vital now to help remove the seeds of future conflicts.

Bahrain also feels that Western countries are in disagreement as to what role each country must play in this vital region. And there is also disagreement on the actual objectives they are trying to achieve. The recent UN-Iraq standoff is a particular example. We believe the absence of a common strategic objective was the cause of disharmony between the Western states. We all learned from the Gulf War that, in order to bring together the whole international community, we must have an overall goal acceptable to all parties. That is why Bahrain believed that further military confrontation with Iraq was a last resort. This belief was based on the following premises.

First, that a politically premature military strike would have been counter productive and provided the Iraqi regime with greater external support, rather than the intended objective of weakening and deterring.

Second, allowing more time for diplomatic efforts may have brought about the necessary level of international consensus to bring about a unified stand with which to face the Iraqi regime.

In brief, Bahrain believed that the optimal way to peacefully solve this crisis, when there was no clear international or Arab mandate for use of force, was through sustained diplomatic efforts backed by military pressure, whilst at the same time achieving international consensus to deny Iraq the opportunity to exploit any perceived differences in the position of GCC states towards this use of force.

If this was not done, there were three possible consequences.

First, it could have provided excuses for further breaches of applicable security council resolutions, and military action would have lost its legitimacy.

Second, Iraq would have continued its intransigence or;
Third, a rift with unknown ramifications could have occurred, not only on the Arab front, where solidarity with the suffering of the Iraqi people and sometimes with the Iraqi regime itself unfortunately is growing, but also within the GCC and its frontline efforts to face the Iraqi regime.

Therefore, it is vital the West first reaches agreement itself on the required courses of action before attempting to reach a joint and credible political understanding with the GCC states.

Mr Chairman, from its beginning, the West’s military cooperation with the region was founded to defend the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf region, and protect the vital interests of the West. Any cooperation requires a framework. The existing defence agreements, even if initially only bilateral, are the right tools for formalising the process of cooperation. The West, as well as the GCC states, must be committed to the defence of the Arabian Peninsula and the West’s vital interests. Initial consultation, followed by the use of force, is an acceptable mechanism only if the initial consultation is taken seriously by all. We should consult immediately whenever GCC state is threatened, but similarly there must be immediate consultation when force is needed to defend the West’s vital interests. Bahrain believes this last element has often been found wanting. Adherence to this concept will serve all national interests, and adherence is best provided for by a clearly agreed policy for the use of force. Commitment to initial consultations will allow us to avoid dilemmas arising over the use of such force such as those witnessed in the recent UN-Iraq standoff.

Mr Chairman, I wish to also raise two issues that are incidental to the GCC’s defence cooperation with the West which are nevertheless of paramount importance when considering the effectiveness of our partnership. They are consideration of the peace process, and the provision of a joint strategy to combat terrorism. Bahrain, in common with the whole of the GCC states, welcomes the recent initiatives to put the Middle East peace process back on track. The peace process is a strategic option for the GCC as well as the entire region. That is why it is vital that the defence cooperation between the GCC and the West must not contradict the current efforts to save the peace process or any other future initiatives or developments. On the contrary, it must support and enhance such efforts. In particular, UN resolutions should be respected and applied evenly and should not be undermined by perceived bias. A further fundamental of our efforts should be a comprehensive sustainable understanding, by all concerned, of the need to work towards establishing a Middle East that is free from all weapons of mass destruction. These methods must encompass all states with such capabilities.

Bahrain, as well as other states represented here today, has been tragically affected by the phenomenon of terrorism. Today’s terrorists have many faces, some of which might be acceptable to a few in the West, and they are capable of skilfully inducing global media and modern technology to their greatest advantage. Bahrain’s experience is that international cooperation is a prerequisite to ensure that terrorists cannot organise, operate and publicise their crimes, and it is vitally necessary to achieving justice. No safe haven can be provided for terrorists, their supporters or fronts, and active open dialogue between the concerned parties in the GCC and the West is long overdue. Because of actions not taken, it is the West’s interests that will be threatened over the long term – the scenario of a biological weapon in a suitcase is disturbing to say the least.
Mr Chairman, I hope I have provided today a brief insight into Bahrain’s position regarding the future security of the Gulf region. My country is committed to ensuring the effectiveness and readiness of the GCC to face external aggression with one voice. We recognise the need for and welcome cooperation with the West, but remain concerned that much still needs to be done to cement and build further on the hard work already achieved. In turn, I will of course take back with me to Bahrain may useful and valuable ideas that have been so eloquently expressed by the participants. Thank you very much.